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Sharing: Post-Scarcity Beyond Capitalism? 
Abstract  
Regarding efficiency, efficacy and incentive, free-sharing online (of recordings, 
live-broadcasts, software and published works) outperforms market and 
property systems, by reducing costs of production and distribution, increasing 
quality and access, and better promoting creativity. Free-sharing online 
emerged within ‘global network capitalism’ and non-capitalist networks. Free-
sharing of purely informational content online challenges capitalism by 
eliminating scarcity. However, post-scarcity is limited by constraints on time 
and the capacity to filter digital plenitude. These limits create scope for 
alternative business models. Free-sharing online tempers capitalism’s ‘tragedy 
of the anticommons’. However, to date, post-scarcity remains incomplete.  
 
Introduction 
This article begins with a brief account of the emergence of free-sharing 
online. This emergence is then located within ‘global network capitalism’ and 
non-capitalist global digital networks, before the relationship between free-
sharing and capitalism is more fully explored. More specifically, here, an 
outline of the economic concepts of ‘efficiency’, ‘efficacy’ and ‘incentive’ 
creates a framework through which the challenge of free-sharing to markets 
and property-based arrangements can be evaluated. Following on from this, it 
is argued that free-sharing may afford viable ‘alternatives to business’ when it 
offers greater efficiency, efficacy and/or incentive. Where this is not so, 
‘alternative business models’ may arise to sell what remains scarce. The 
examples of recordings, sports broadcasting, software and publishing are then 
examined. In each case, the relative efficiency, efficacy and incentive created 
by free-sharing and market-/property-based arrangements are addressed. In 
conclusion, it will be suggested that, whilst capitalism creates a ‘tragedy of the 
anticommons’, and free-sharing poses a challenge to this in creating post-
scarcity in pure informational content, time, trust, the ability to filter 
information, and co-presence remains scarce. Whilst significant, the triumph of 
the commons remains constrained, at least for now. 
A genealogy of free-sharing online 
Free-sharing online developed from sharing compressed music files, through to 
larger visual recordings and, now, live content (Kirton and David, 2013). Digital 
compression formats were developed initially in the 1980s by a consortium of 
universities and businesses to enable primarily commercial distribution of 
content, both internally within the production process and externally to 
customers via CDs, DVDs, cable or satellite (David, 2010). The civilian Internet 
(initially in the US in the late 1980s), and the World Wide Web (initially in 
Europe in the early 1990s), were developed by non-commercial groups with 
the same technical aim: of enabling distribution of content, within research 
teams and to wider audiences. In 1999, Shaun Fanning’s Napster combined the 
MP3 file-compression format, web-based Internet distribution, and a novel 
search and exchange program, to make free-sharing of digital music a global 
‘threat’ to the traditional recording industry’s business model. A cat-and-
mouse game then ensued between intellectual property (IP) defenders and 
evermore legally and technically distributed forms of digital-sharing. After 
Napster was shut down, new services developed that avoided its central-
server-based, legal ‘Achilles heel’. Fully peer-to-peer (distributed exchange) 
services excluded service providers from liability. Peers- to-peer services 
(torrents), meanwhile, excluded up-loaders from liability. Today, peers-to-
peers services (streaming) exempts down-loaders. Each new generation of 
software removed the bottleneck that the law came to target within sharing 
networks (David, 2013). Technical development was driven by attempts to 
evade legal liability and to increase carrying capacity. Whilst compression first 
allowed small, recorded music files to be shared online, with long waits to 
download recorded visual content, the development of faster bandwidths 
enabled live-visual content to be viewed clearly online from the late 2000s 
(Birmingham and David, 2011; David and Millward, 2012). The capacity to 
share content freely has outstripped legal and technical attempts to prevent it 
(Brown, 2015). 
Whilst free digital-sharing arose in the copyright domain (music, publishing, 
visual media and software), the 3D printer revolution (Rifkin, 2014) will make 
IP-rich physical goods available to ‘download’. However, to date, ‘free’-sharing 
of (IP-infringing) information contained in patent and trademark goods still 
requires what IP holders call ‘pirate capitalist’ intermediaries to actually make 
the usable objects (Rojek, 2015). This article, however, is primarily concerned 
with free-sharing rather than commercial generics, counterfeiting and piracy. 
As such, this article focuses upon the free-sharing of content protected under 
copyright - in particular, recorded music, live sports broadcasting, software and 
publishing (trade, journalistic and academic), with a brief note on film.  
 ‘Global network capitalism’ or global network society? 
Post-Cold War ‘global network capitalism’ has deregulated labour while 
strengthening property protection, particularly in the case of IP. In ‘global 
network capitalism’, monopoly IP protection has been extended in time, space, 
scope and depth (David and Halbert, 2015). Deregulated labour reduces the 
cost of physical things, whilst globally regulated IP increases the value of 
‘immaterial content’. It is IP regulation that explains the relative value of 
‘information’ over ‘objects’ today, not any ‘logic’ of an ‘information society’. 
The World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) first act was its 1994/5 Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Treaty. TRIPS acted to harmonise global 
IP protection. At the time, the perceived threat was commercial infringement. 
A year later, the World Intellectual Property Organisation’s (WIPO) Copyright 
Treaty (1996) first addressed the threat of free digital-sharing. In 1996, cheap 
CD burners were the perceived challenge (ibid). 
Free-sharing within global digital networks must be located alongside the rise 
of ‘global network capitalism’ and the contradictions inherent within it (David 
and Halbert, 2015). On the one hand, globalisation furthers the interests of a 
market- and property-based system: it expands markets (through deregulation 
of trade barriers and integration of distribution chains); it extends property 
rights protection, in particular over IP (harmonising national laws through 
multi- and bi-lateral treaties – Yu, 2015); and it reduces costs through global 
outsourcing of production to cheaper labour markets (Chon, 2015). On the 
other hand, globalisation works against these interests, by affording pirate, 
counterfeit and generic ‘outsourcing’ of production and distribution (Rojek, 
2015). Similarly, digital networks expand markets and reduce costs for 
copyright holders, whether in music, film, broadcasting, software or publishing 
(David, 2013). This is even as digital compression, distribution and processing 
afford widespread circumvention of legal channels of circulation and technical 
means of encryption (David and Kirkhope, 2004). Even the ‘capitalism’ of 
‘global network capitalism’ contains a contradiction between markets and IP 
monopoly. IP is designed to suspend market competition to protect property, 
but pirate capitalists propagate illicit markets at the expense of IP-based 
monopoly profits. Whether ‘capitalism’ is primarily defined by ‘markets’ 
(Weber, 1930) or by ‘private property’ (Marx, 1995) remains contested, and 
not just ‘in theory’.  
Yet, even as ‘global network capitalism’ laid down many of the contradictions 
in which free-sharing networks operate today, global networks are not simply 
‘capitalist’. Non-commercial actors played a crucial role in creating today’s 
network infrastructure (in particular the Internet - Abbate 1999, and the Web 
Bernes-Lee 2000). They continue to do so as part of a global network economy 
and culture of free-sharing. 
 
The economics of sharing and of capitalism 
Economics commonly concerns itself with questions of producing and 
distributing rivalrous goods - goods where one ‘use’ limits or even exhausts 
further use (Robbins, 1935). Property rights and markets are one (but not the 
only) set of social institutions designed to manage the rivalrous quality of time 
and things. Non-rivalrous goods, in contrast, are goods where one user’s use 
does not limit further use (Phythian-Adams, 2015, p. 33). ‘Sharing’ relates to 
markets and property rights in divergent ways, depending upon the rivalrous 
or non-rivalrous quality of the goods being ‘shared’. ‘Sharing’ rivalrous goods 
can take the form of renting, lending, disintermediated exchange and/or barter 
- although the term ‘sharing’ is problematic in relation to such financialised 
modes of allocation (Hern, 2015). Whilst such ‘sharing’ of one’s own tangible 
goods and time may extend capitalism at the level of exchange relations, IP-
infringing free-sharing challenges capitalism at the level of property rights. 
More specifically, digital networks may extend markets whilst undoing 
property rights (such as in the distribution of generic medicines and 
counterfeit designer goods, and in the production and distribution of ‘pirate 
capitalist’ CDs and DVDs - Rojek, 2015); or, in cases where property rights are 
upheld, it may extend markets to new forms of rental, lending, direct exchange 
and barter (Reference examples from this special issue?). Additionally, digital 
networks can afford free-sharing of time and things within specified (high-
trust) communities (Refer to example(s) from this special issue?). In relation to 
fully non-rivalrous informational goods, where there is no physical limit to 
multiple and simultaneous use, digital networks afford free-sharing that 
challenges both markets and property rights.  
Free-sharing (as distinct from digitally enabled renting, paid lending, direct 
exchange and barter), if consigned to the private domains of friends and 
family, may not challenge markets and property rights. Unpaid domestic 
labour fundamentally underpins markets and property-based systems 
(Crompton, 1997, pp. 83-98), yet it is precisely the ‘private’ character of such 
‘giving’ that has reinforced its theoretical and material undervaluation. 
However, digital networks increase the scope for free-sharing within a global 
‘public’ domain. Free speech was central to the emergence of a public sphere 
in the ‘long 18th century’ (Habermas, 1992). Today, free-sharing is central to 
creating and defending a public domain in opposition to the full marketisation 
and proprietary enclosure of social life (Dutton, 2009).  
How, then, does the free-sharing of digital goods challenge market- and 
property-based arrangements? Is free-sharing just an efficient (cheap) mode of 
distribution (i.e. copying), parasitising property-based production 
arrangements; is it a viable mode of production still requiring a market-based 
mode of distribution; or is it a viable alternative foundation for production and 
distribution? This issue can be broken down and explored in relation to three 
elements: efficiency; efficacy; and incentive.  
Efficiency relates to the cost by which an end is achieved. Economists divide 
efficiency into the following modes: production, allocation, informational, 
transactional, and ‘Pareto optimisation’ (Heyne, 2008). Production efficiency 
refers to the cost of making particular goods, whilst allocational efficiency 
refers to optimising investment of resources. Informational efficiency, 
meanwhile, refers to the cost of information needed in decision making, and 
transactional efficiency refers to the cost of actually acquiring, or accessing 
something chosen.  
Efficacy is closely connected to efficiency, but relates to the utility of 
outcomes, rather than just the cost of achieving them. It refers to both the 
‘quality’ of the product made and the overall utility supplied (the quantity of 
such quality). Whilst production and allocational efficiency are linked within a 
narrow definition of efficiency as concerning only the costs of production; 
informational and transactional efficiency extend the concept of efficiency into 
the domains of circulation (i.e. distribution); they thus have a significant impact 
on issues of efficacy, of utility, in terms of informed choice and access. ‘Pareto 
optimisation’ refers to a state of overall efficiency where total utility cannot be 
increased by reallocating rivalrous resources. Whilst this zero-sum calculation 
is irrelevant in relation to non-rivalrous goods, the resource of time remains 
limited even, or perhaps especially, in relation to such digital plenitude and 
efficiency; the efficacy of these goods is thus impacted. This becomes very 
significant in the economics of post-scarcity, as will be shown below.  
Incentive, meanwhile, refers to levels of motivation, either in terms of techno-
scientific innovation or artistic creativity. This article demonstrates, then, how 
free-sharing of non-rivalrous informational goods (specifically) outperforms 
market and property-based systems across all three dimensions (efficiency, 
efficacy and incentive). Importantly, free-sharing does so in particular ways, 
within particular limits, and only for purely informational goods. 
 
Alternative business models or alternatives to business? 
Facebook’s business model is built upon selling advertising to those who share 
their lives freely on its service. Google sells eyeballs to advertisers, primarily in 
relation to freely shared content (Vaidhyanathan, 2012). YouTube, and other 
peer-based free-sharing services, also make their money from advertising. 
Freely shared content is, then, the basis for a range of very successful, 
alternative business models. Even as traditional record companies, film 
studios, publishers and broadcasters have bemoaned the rise of free-sharing, 
the largest of them are owned by cross-media conglomerates that sell the 
Internet access and services that enable infringement (Castells, 2009; David, 
Kirton and Millward, 2015). Freely shared content can be good for business, 
but only if, while the content is free, something remains scarce to 
intermediaries’ potential customers. Informational content cannot be kept 
scarce within a global network society; indeed, it is this potential for post-
scarcity that threatens/promises to turn reduced cost into radical price 
reduction, potentially to zero (Rifkin, 2014). What do remain scarce; however, 
are time, knowledge, physical material and co-presence. Where these things 
are not significant, free-sharing outperforms pay- to-access alternatives. 
Importantly, where such scarce resources are significant, markets continue to 
operate even when property rights in intangibles are not enforceable or 
necessary. 
Nonetheless, where the marginal cost of the next copy of an informational 
good approaches zero, scarcity in such a good is abolished, and the need for - 
and superiority of - markets and property rights as efficient and effective 
allocative mechanisms is challenged. Networked computers make this so for all 
purely informational content (recordings, broadcasts, software and written 
works). Nonetheless, marginal cost is not full cost. Prior fixed costs remain. 
Does the recovery of such fixed costs require markets and property rights? If 
free-sharing of outcomes does not incentivise the production of efficient and 
effective products (only instead parasitising prior achievements), markets and 
property rights may be warranted after all. It is to these three related issues, of 
efficiency, effectiveness and incentive, that this article now turns – and an 
examination of the aforementioned cases of music, live-sports broadcasting, 
software and publishing. In each case the relative merits of market-/property- 
and free-sharing-based arrangements will be compared in terms of efficiency, 




Free-sharing of digital content brings the cost of each additional copy close to 
zero - what Jeremy Rifkin (2014) calls ‘the zero marginal cost society’. These 
conditions can be seen most clearly in the case of recorded music. Free-sharing 
was essential in the creation of the ‘common standards’ by which such 
efficiency was achieved and transaction costs, in particular, reduced to a 
minimum. Record companies in the early 1980s (led by the small number of 
‘major’ labels) did manage to agree a common standard for the digital compact 
disc (CD), a much more efficient mode of production and distribution than 
vinyl (or tape). However, record companies failed to agree any common 
standard of encryption with the companies who would make the CD players 
(David, 2010). Similarly, record labels in the 1990s could not agree upon a 
common digital online platform through which ‘their’ music could be 
distributed even more efficiently. Different companies experimented 
unsuccessfully with stand-alone websites selling their own artists’ work. This 
defence of each company’s monopoly control over the distribution of its own 
content was undone by the development of Napster and subsequent peer-to-
peer file-sharing services. These services harnessed the potential for 
compression, location and distribution beyond the divergent standards being 
offered by commercial actors. Without free-sharing establishing a common 
standard, record companies would not have made a deal with iTunes. 
Therefore, even Apple’s proprietary service owes its existence to free-sharing 
(David, 2010). The same is also true of today’s legal streaming services (e.g. 
Spotify and Beats). Such services seek to tame illegal free-copying simply by, 
well, copying it, making free-access legal only after it had already become 
ubiquitous (David, 2016). 
 
Efficacy 
Free-sharing services have made all the recorded music currently in existence 
available to every networked computer user on the planet, for nothing, and 
instantly; this includes material not currently commercially available. Users can 
choose freely from across the sum of human musical history, to compare, 
sample and experiment with music of every conceivable genre and 
geographical origin. Whilst compression initially reduced sound ‘quality’, faster 
broadband Internet now makes it perfectly possible to receive high quality 
content online.  
 
Incentive  
The standard recording contract reflects an outdated and inefficient pre-digital 
production and distribution model David 2010: 118-43). Record companies 
offer artists 10-15% of net sales as royalties in exchange for copyright in the 
recorded work. The company then offers to sell - produce, manufacture, 
distribute, market and ‘rights-manage’ - this work (Hull, 2004). From this 
arrangement, most artists end up owing their label money because not only 
does the record company take the greater share of net earnings, it also 
deducts the greater part of the cost involved in production, marketing and 
rights management from the royalties owed to the artists (and not from the 
greater share it already takes for itself). Failure to ‘recoup’ the greater part of 
the work’s cost from the small fraction of sales value assigned to the artist in 
royalties means most recording artists remain in debt to their record 
companies even when their works are profitable for their labels. Most records 
do not make a profit and are subsidised by the few works that do recover their 
full cost; however, the number of records that recover their cost from total 
sales is far higher than the number that ‘recoup’, i.e. that recover their costs 
from the value of royalties alone. Whilst almost all records fail to ‘recoup’, a 
certain number, then, are profitable - just not for the artist who recorded 
them. Production, manufacture, distribution, and marketing are increasingly 
open to digital-sharing alternatives. In such circumstances, rights management 
(the fifth dimension of what record companies ‘offer’ artists) represents little 
more than the organisation of debt-bondage arising from traditional contracts.  
Free-sharing offers scope to attract a paying live audience without incurring 
the debt that usually accompanies a record contract. Few artists actually get 
paid for their recorded works, so freely distributed work reaches a wider 
audience at no loss to the artist (David, 2010). If recordings are freely given 
away, can there be any incentive to create them in the first place? The answer 
is yes. The reduction of opportunity costs incurred by fans (no longer having to 
balance the cost of recordings against that for concerts tickets) means more 
money is spent attending live-performances. Alan Krueger (2004) shows the 
causal relationship between reduced spending on recordings (due to free-
sharing alternatives) and increased concert ticket sales and prices. Krueger also 
highlights that artists receive better payment from live-performance than from 
recording. As such, free-sharing actually increases the amount artists get paid. 
(Similarly, downloading/streaming films encourages cinema attendance, which 
has risen with free-sharing even as the video rental market has collapsed 
(David, 2010)).  
 
Live sports broadcasting 
Efficiency 
The development of digital sports television in the 1990s occurred prior to 
Internet bandwidth being sufficient to allow Internet users to live-stream visual 
content. Satellite and cable providers used legal monopolies to buy up, and 
technical limits to control access to, formally free-to-air ‘terrestrial’ sports 
broadcasts. Access was then sold back to fans for what had previously been 
free (David, Kirton and Millward, 2015). Fans have suffered spiralling monopoly 
prices to access content. Anxiety over such pricing led regulators in some 
countries to insist on rights being parcelled out to more than one provider. 
Fans in these jurisdictions now pay multiple providers to access the portion of 
content for which each provider has bought the monopoly rights. It is in both 
contexts that web-based live-streaming channels, via increased Internet 
broadband speeds, have grown in popularity. Cutting through legal and 
technical limits, live-streaming allows fans to access all matches, in all sports, in 
all leagues (if they are broadcast somewhere), freely through one platform 
(David, Kirton and Millward, 2016).  
 
Efficacy 
When sport was first broadcast on television in the 1930s, visual quality was so 
low viewers could not see the ball (Barnett, 1990). The same was true of early 
live-streaming. Today’s broadband and digital television eliminate this inferior 
quality. Even matches embargoed for paying viewers in home countries at kick-
off time are accessible to live-streamers (re-routing content from other 
jurisdictions). As such, quality and quantity are actually higher via streaming 
services than via proprietary channels. Set top router boxes that direct users to 
streaming channels (reducing search time to parallel traditional television 
channel hopping), and virtual proxy networks that bypass legal site blocking 
tactics (by which rights holders have sought to limit the efficacy of streaming 
services), ensure that streaming services continue to offer more and better 
content for less.  
As with free-sharing in music, the common platform created by live-streaming 
channels, via the common standards underpinning the Internet and the Web, 
undoes monopoly closure - and so increases informational and transactional 




The claim that sport is best ‘incentivised’ by the escalating payments afforded 
by global digital subscription services is questionable at best. What Castells 
(2009) calls the ‘Murdochisation’ of sport is precisely what King (2002) calls 
‘hyper-commercialisation’. This model of sport assumes that money is the only 
incentive to perform. This assumption stands in stark contrast to principles of 
fair play and fan loyalty that underpin sport, and spectator sport in particular. 
The rise of free-streaming threatens hyper-commercialisation; this does not 
harm sport itself, only those seeking to leverage significant profits from its 
supporters. 
Rights revenue escalation has fuelled chronic player salary inflation, leaving 
around half of clubs in elite leagues technically insolvent, despite the flow of 
additional money (Bose, 2010). At the same time, player inflation does not 
incentivise better ‘play’. It may even damage sports by creating a scenario 
where the same super-rich teams and leagues can afford all the best players, 
hence reducing the spectacle of ‘competition’. 
 
Software 
Efficiency and efficacy 
Free-sharing of information is fundamental to the creation of the ‘common 
knowledge’ that in turn enables fair access, informed choice and quality of 
outcomes in any transactional context (including, but not exclusively, markets). 
The creation of property rights in information - a pre-condition for markets in 
information - creates fundamental asymmetries between suppliers and 
prospective users, well summarised in Henry Hansmann’s (1980) ‘contract 
failure theory’. Where information is IP-protected, prospective users are 
denied the free and perfect information required to make optimal selection 
decisions prior to purchase, and often even afterwards. Without reasonable 
knowledge, there can be no reasoned choice. Secondly, monopoly over 
informational goods restricts the supply of alternatives, disadvantaging 
consumers both in terms of immediate price competition and, further, in 
stifling future improvements induced by cooperation (or competition). Such 
‘market failure’ (Weisbrod, 1977) is best solved by the free circulation of 
information as a ‘public good’. Free-sharing of information, in maximising 
‘informational efficiency’, leads to optimal efficacy in terms of the quality and 
availability of outcomes. 
Jyn-An Lee (2015) documents the development of non-profit organisations 
dedicated to the promotion and protection of open access in the production of 
informational goods - such as the Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) 
movement, the Free Software Foundation (FSF), Creative Commons (CC), Copy 
Left, The Wikipedia Foundation, and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). 
It is not just that open source software, which is freely available to use and 
modify without payment or permission, outperforms proprietary code making 
(Moody, 2002). ‘Common knowledge’, as ‘shared culture’ and ‘public good’, is 
the foundation for future works and the best means of ensuring informed 
choice for users. As such, in terms of production and allocation efficiency, free-
sharing outperforms proprietary models in software. 
 Incentive 
The best demonstration of the inferiority of silo-based (privately owned) 
corporate research and development, relative to free-sharing-based 
innovation, is in digital rights management (DRM) programming and the 
computer hackers that break it. DRM is the point at which IP and IT 
(information technology) meet - what Laurence Lessig (1999) calls ‘code as 
law’. If the law cannot prevent infringement, maybe better locks can. If hackers 
outperform IP-regulated coders in this domain - the domain that is the very 
foundation of IP in IT - it is hardly likely that IP-regulated/regulating code will 
be better anywhere else. The removal of Apple’s Fairplay encryption from 
iTunes in 2008 (David, 2010) came as a result of the failure of Apple (the 
world’s largest computer corporation by sales) to prevent its software being 
undone by hackers. Hackers’ free-sharing approach to innovation routinely 
outperforms that of corporate rivals. Apple’s Fairplay is just the most famous 
illustration of what Pekka Himanen (2001: 111-35) calls ‘the hacker ethic and 
the spirit of informationalism’, and Johan Sӧderberg (2008: 190-92) calls ‘play 
struggle’. This willingness to co-produce code for the sake of recognition within 
a community of creative hackers routinely overcomes silo-based research 
carried out by ‘code-monkeys’ and ‘micro-serfs’ (Coupland, 1995) - people 
employed to ‘create’ code, but who are alienated from what they produce. 
Ironically, hackers feel greater ‘ownership’ over what they co-produce for 
nothing and give away for free, than do employees paid to produce but whose 




Far from causing the degrading of print and broadcast journalism, the 
Internet’s challenge is as a substitute: the rise of ‘citizen journalism’ (Allen, 
2013), freely sharing content online. Abraham Zapruder sold the rights over his 
footage of John F. Kennedy’s killing in 1963 to Life magazine for $150,000 (US). 
The footage was not seen by the public for over a decade. George Holliday 
filmed the beating of Rodney King in 1991 on an early digital camcorder. His 
attempt to sell the footage failed and it was released publically within a week. 
The fusion of digital mobile phones, cameras and the World Wide Web meant 
footage of the Asian Tsunami of 2004 was instantly relayed worldwide by those 
present and victim to the events. The killing of Colonel Gadhafi in Libya in 2011 
was filmed and broadcast on the phones of the killers themselves. More recent 
staged killings by terrorists escalate such grotesque ‘un-mediated media’ 
spectacle. Witnesses, participants, and even the perpetrators of ‘news’, now 
also broadcast this ‘news’, and do so first.  
Relying upon citizen journalistic content, such as in the use of photographs 
taken by Colonel Gadhafi’s killers of his killing and his corpse on the front page 
of The Sun newspaper in 2011, cuts costs. Reporters, photographers and other 
news staff have been made redundant (Allen 2013). The killing of US television 
news reporter Alison Parker and cameraman Alan Ward by a former (but 
recently sacked) colleague in August 2015, and the killer’s online broadcast of 
the killings, adds another sickening twist to this dynamic. Cutting costs by 
outsourcing to more efficient, free, online sources further weakens the 
rationale for accessing such ‘old’ media.  
 
Efficacy 
The Internet is not to blame for ‘the crises’ in journalism and broadcast news. 
A ‘digital revolution’ in the 1980s and 1990s, in publishing and broadcasting 
(not over the Internet), saw an explosion in both the number of titles via 
digitised production techniques, and the number of channels via satellite and 
cable (McRobbie and Thornton, 1995). This spread advertising revenues ever 
thinner, putting particular pressure on ‘expensive’ in-house news production 
(Curran and Seaton, 2010). Neither is the Internet to blame for the supposed 
rise of ‘churnalism’ (Davies, 2008), the reliance of cash-strapped and time-
short news-makers on the pre-packaged ‘sound bites’ and ‘press releases’ of 
powerful actors and institutions. The ‘hierarchy of news’, and ‘the news 
cycle’s’ reliance upon dominant voices to supply most content, is nothing new 
(Cohen, 1972; Hall et. al, 1978; and Habermas, 1992). 
 
The ‘editorial’ defence of traditional broadcast and print journalism, that 
professional news makers are best able to select and package events, becomes 
problematic when such editorial selection has become synonymous with 
editorial ‘bias’ in favour of advertiser and proprietor interests (Habermas, 
1992); additionally, titles and channels find themselves continually ‘behind the 
curve’ (relative to the Internet) in revealing the very sensational human 
interest scoops in which, until recently, contemporary ‘news’ (infotainment) 
makers had believed they were the leaders (Castells, 2009). With these issues 
in mind, it becomes harder to defend ‘quality’ news production against direct 
Internet citizen journalism. Such difficulties are compounded by the recurrent 
use of citizen up-loaded content in commercial media coverage.  
However, the choice by Wikileaks in 2011, to co-publish and co-edit (with 
various ‘quality’ newspapers) evidence from US Afghan and Iraqi war logs, 
along with an array of its embassy cables (Beckett and Ball, 2012) suggests that 
editorial efficacy remains valued sometimes. This case indicates not just the 
desire of traditional media to draw upon freely shared whistle blower sites like 
Wikileaks, but also Wikileaks’ desire for the credibility and audience reach of 
traditional quality newspapers.  
 
Incentive  
The incentives for ‘citizen witnesses’ to ‘report’ their own direct experiences to 
the world via new media sharing channels may be similar to those that guide 
‘professional’ journalists: the desire to tell the truth and expose lies. Other 
incentives, such as political interest and self-publicity, are also present in both 
citizen and professional reporting. The lack of payment, and the lack of 
editorial bias, favours citizen journalism over paid forms. The fact that 
professional journalists also blog, tweet and up-load content for free via 
sharing services highlights that the ‘incentive’ to tell it like it is goes beyond the 
bounds of traditional media editorial constraints, even for those working 
within conventional media. That audiences sometimes ‘trust’ particular 
professional sources to select and interpret for them also suggests that pure 
information is not always enough. Information overload creates problems in a 
post-scarcity world that cannot always solved without payment (Anderson 
2008).  
 
Academic publishing  
Efficiency 
Academic journal prices rose 3000% in the last three decades of the 20th 
century, and they continue to spiral upwards at an average of 13% a year 
(Thompson, 2005). Free contributions by authors are reviewed free of charge 
by other academics, and are also edited in most cases without payment. 
Commercial publishers, noting a captive market in university libraries, bought 
up key titles and now sell content back to the very academics that made such 
content freely available in the first place. The struggle within digital networks 
between open access and digital closure (for example, firewalls and 
subscription services), is ongoing (David, 1996; Vaidhyanathan, 2012). 
Academic authors are unpaid in almost all cases. Where payments are made, 
for textbooks and commissioned reports, the academic credibility of the work 
is often questioned.  
 
Efficacy 
If academics want to be read, and if their work has some value to either an 
academic or a non-academic audience, its free circulation online can only 
benefit both author and reader. As work is rarely produced for payment, free 
circulation cannot reduce quality or productivity, but it can increase access and 
impact. The quality of academic research and future publications depends 
upon access to prior work, so, again, free-sharing can only increase the overall 
quality and utility of intellectual content. The expression ‘standing on the 
shoulders of giants’ in practice means ‘looking over the shoulders of giants’ - in 
order to access and read their work.  
 
Incentive 
The incentive structure in science is to give knowledge away to receive credit 
as discoverer/innovator (Merton, 1972). Charles Darwin’s race to publish ‘his’ 
theory of evolution arose because, if Alfred Wallace had published first, it 
would have been Wallace instead who received the epithet ‘his’. Scientists are 
incentivised to publish their results without payment to gain recognition as 
scientists. This is what Robert Merton (1972) called ‘academic communism’, 
the principle that all work should be made available to the community of 
researchers such that credit could be awarded, criticism made and future 
development facilitated. This gift economy is not unbridled altruism. Freely 





Free-sharing of creative content is the well-spring for new works. This is a 
pressing justification for libraries, whether of stone and paper or digital 
networks (Vaidhyanathan, 2004). Following this line of argument, the best and 
cheapest way to promote literacy and literature is to make the entire stock of 
past literature accessible to all, readers and prospective authors alike.  
Free-sharing of books online creates a ‘very long tail’. Chris Anderson’s (2008) 
‘long tail’ describes how Amazon’s stock list exceeds that of any physical 
bookshop, and how Amazon’s profits stem more from the sum of all the small 
sales than from the best sellers that provide bookshops with most of their 
profit. A ‘very long tail’ is produced when all the books currently in or out of 
print are made available online, potentially for nothing. The Google books 
project, currently on hold for legal reasons (Vaidhyanathan, 2012), could afford 
such a ‘very long tail’, extending the leap in transactional and informational 
efficiency free-sharing online already delivers.  
 Efficacy 
Since the US signed the Berne Treaty in 1988, and after TRIPS, global IP 
protectionism has incentivised the rise of ‘big books’ (celebrity cookbooks, 
‘pot-boilers’ and ‘repeaters’). Horizontal and vertical integration of publishing 
houses within global cross-media corporations, the outsourcing of new 
content-‘scouting’ to agents who must deliver works that fit the ‘big book’ 
frame, and a diminishing market share to those who do not have ‘profile’ 
(media presence), ‘track record’ (past sales), ‘comps’ (similarity to existing 
works) or ‘fit’ (a media-marketable ‘personality’/ ‘life’), mean only a few 
hundred ‘established’ and/or corporate media-‘friendly’ authors make a living 
from copyright royalties (Thompson, 2012). Global copyright extension has 
reduced quality and choice. Free-sharing - in reducing the profits currently 
driving the ‘big books’ model of production, distribution and marketing - would 
at the least offer wider variety (assuming authors still write – see below). 
 
Incentive 
T. S. Eliot suggested that: ‘Immature poets imitate, mature poets steal’. He was 
not the first to say this! Eliot ‘borrowed’ the line from Mark Twain, who was 
also no slouch in taking good ideas when he found them (Vaidhyanathan, 
2003). Prior to joining the Berne Treaty, Twain’s United States did not respect 
the copyright of foreign authors, which (paralleling Krueger’s findings 
regarding music and live-performance today) explains why Charles Dickens 
made more money from speaking tours in America than he did selling books in 
his own (copyright-respecting) England (Pearl, 2013).  
Most writers earn more from working for hire - as journalists, teachers, public 
speakers, ghost writers, and so on than from ‘author’ royalties. The free-
distribution of their written work is good publicity for the ‘work’ most actually 
make a living from (Silbey, 2015). Free circulation of an author’s work is in fact 
rather a good way to build a paying fan-base, when, for hundreds of thousands 
of published authors, the standard copyright closure model has failed (Liebler, 
2015). 
 
The ‘tragedy of the Anticommons’ 
Research on rivalrous ‘common pool resources’ (Ostrom 1990)  shows how 
non-proprietary and non-market-based sharing communities regulate over-
use; debunking metaphorical overextension of Garrett Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy 
of the commons’. Similarly, free-sharing of non-rivalrous informational goods 
(Hess and Ostrom, eds., 2011, and in this article) shows both the capacity of 
the commons; and overcomes the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ (Heller 1998) 
when property rights create sub-optimal (monopoly) levels of production and 
pricing, or where multiple property claims generate gridlocked non-production 
(Heller 2008). Table 1, summarises ‘The benefits of free-sharing’. 
 
Insert Table 1 near here! 
 
Efficacy, in terms of quality of outcomes, is not improved by markets and 
property rights. The ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ is manifested in the 
inferiority of silo-based software coding, relative to open source programming 
and hacker practices. Where knowledge is privately owned and sold, ‘contract 
failure’ and ‘market failure’ produce further ‘tragedies of the anticommons’ in 
undermining choice and quality for users. Efficacy, in terms of total utility, is 
restricted and prices escalate via pay-to-view digital subscription services (and 
legal attempts to block free-access alternatives) - this relative to the cost (free) 
and access (everything, everywhere) provided by live-streaming services. 
Global IP regulation and cross-media integration has seen book sales 
concentrate in a shrinking number of formulaic ‘big books’. The 
commodification of news diminishes the quality of public discourse. Copyright 
control over academic journal articles enables chronic ‘price gouging’ and 
places new knowledge beyond most people’s reach. 
 
Copyright in recorded music fails to reward or incentivise artists, leaving most 
in debt to their record companies, as most sales revenue goes to repay record 
companies for the cost of their grossly inefficient model of production and 
distribution. ‘Play struggle’ and the ‘hacker ethic’ better incentivises than does 
corporate control over employees. Similarly, peer recognition fuels academic 
writing, not payment for publication. Direct fan engagement via free-access 
offers more opportunity for payment to more authors than the globally IP-
regulated, ‘big books’ industry model. Citizen witnessing and fan/club loyalty 
offer alternative models of incentive to the hyper-commercialism of 
‘Murdochisation’, without its corrosive influence on both professional 
journalism and sport. Downloading and streaming of films for free has 
increased cinema attendance. 
 
Conclusions: the triumph of the commons? 
Free-sharing of information undoes the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ without 
creating a new ‘tragedy of the commons’. Sharing fosters greater efficiency in 
production and distribution, and - via increased informational and 
transactional efficiency - higher efficacy in terms of utility (quality and overall 
access); at the same time it offers more effective incentives. Post-scarcity 
challenges traditional market- and property-based business models aiming to 
sell content that is otherwise freely available. Post-scarcity is also a challenge 
for alternative business models based on selling advertising linked to free 
content. Advertising revenue is increasingly thinly spread as content 
availability proliferates. Old media formats – newspapers, television and 
academic journals - feed on free content, but are also challenged by new-
media channels that provide access to the same content faster, more cheaply 
and more conveniently. 
Whilst free-sharing maximises efficiency in production and allocation, 
enhances efficacy in terms of informational and transactional costs, and offers 
incentive to creative workers, profit can still be made in offering things that 
remain scarce. In many ways, free-sharing, in reducing costs, increasing quality 
and widening distribution, creates such business opportunities. Google, 
Facebook, YouTube, Spotify and peer-based free-sharing services/sites 
exemplify the new breed of advertising-funded, free content-accessing and 
filtering services. They manifest the triumph of free-access over markets and 
property rights in relation to informational content, but they also make money. 
These services replace ownership and selling with forms of accessing and 
filtering content. They offer management of post-scarcity, not a means for 
allocating scarce content. What remain scarce are time and the capacity to 
filter (edit, understand or trust) the vast quantities of complex and often 
contradictory content available online. It is time-saving and filtering, not 
scarcity of content, that is valued in these companies. Google routinely alters 
its search algorithms to limit manipulation by those seeking to raise their 
ranking in free online searches (Vaidhyanathan, 2012). This creates a market 
for paid search optimisation specialists. The anti-virus computer security 
industry likewise thrives on maximising perceived hacker threats (Wall, 2007: 
16-27). 
Where pure informational content ceases to be scarce, trust and co-presence 
remain limited. As this article has highlighted, artists, performers, authors and 
programmers can earn a better living from new, direct exchanges with fans, 
audiences and end-users precisely because free-sharing eliminates opportunity 
costs and out-dated production, promotion and distribution costs. Live-
performance earnings increase, as do earnings from direct sales and self-
production. Free-sharing is not an alternative to such, at least partially ‘post-
capitalist’, disintermediated exchange. Free-sharing enables this positive 
revaluation of labour, even as it also creates opportunities for new forms of 
corporate filtering. 
 
There is no editorial nexus binding online content to advertiser and proprietary 
interests. Traditional broadcast and print media outlets need to earn trust in 
their editorial practice. In an age of free-sharing, trust is harder to earn. This is 
a good thing. Just as Rifkin (2014) is wrong to think mass online open courses 
(MOOCs) are fundamentally undoing the utility of a ‘traditional’ university 
education, so it is that, even when information is free, demand remains, in 
multiple domains, for those who can translate information into knowledge. 
Increased earnings from live-performance due to publicity and reduced 
opportunity costs mean free-sharing benefits performers, but there may never 
be another ‘studio album’ like Sargent Pepper’s or Pet Sounds. Academic 
authors largely follow a free-sharing ethos, but ‘trade’ authors will see more 
radical disruption, though most will benefit. The future of journalism is even 
more challenging. Elite sports ‘players’ (on and off the field) may see their 
earnings fall, whilst fans gain more control. Software developers will have to 
innovate to survive, but this is no bad thing. 
Additionally, in many cases, content is freely accessible but remains illegal. The 
law continues to uphold markets through defending property rights, which 
depend upon fabricating scarcity to warrant pricing. Post-scarcity in non-
rivalrous goods affords forms of ‘post-capitalism’. However, rivalrous physical 
infrastructure (such as network and computer provision) remains ‘private 
property’; and time-saving, filtering, trust and interpreting services can still 
find a market. Property rights and markets are not the best (efficient, effective 
and incentivising) means of organising the production and distribution of post-
scarcity informational content. Free-sharing is. Whether markets and property 
rights are the best means of allocating access to scarce things is beyond the 
scope of this paper. The 3D printer revolution, however, will extend post-
scarcity deep into what is currently the domain of physical rivalrousness. 
Extending post-scarcity will then raise further questions concerning what can 
and should best be free.  
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Table 1: The benefits of free-sharing 
 Efficiency Efficacy Incentive 
Music Free publicity and 
distribution 
Everything – everywhere  Collapsed opportunity cost 
Software Productivity and 
reduced cost 
Informed choice and 
enabling development 
Peer recognition, ‘hacker 




Single platform for 
all content 
More choice, 
everywhere, for everyone  
Fan support beyond hyper-
commercialisation  
Trade 
Publishing -  
Cost reduction for 
readers and writers 
‘The very long tail’ New author/fan engagement 
beyond  ‘big books’  
Academic 
Publishing -  
Free Open access Peer recognition 
Journalistic 
Publishing -  
Free content As it happens, without 
editorial bias 
Citizen witness  
 
 
